Volunteering in Cross-National Perspective: Evidence From 24 Countries

Lester M. Salamon
Wojciech Sokolowski

Johns Hopkins University

2001
Suggested form of citation:

Preface

This is one in a series of working papers produced under the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (CNP), a collaborative effort by scholars around the world to understand the scope, structure, and role of the nonprofit sector using a common framework and approach. Begun in 1989 in 13 countries, the Project continues to expand, currently encompassing about 40 countries.

The working papers provide a vehicle for the initial dissemination of the work of the Project to an international audience of scholars, practitioners and policy analysts interested in the social and economic role played by nonprofit organizations in different countries, and in the comparative analysis of these important, but often neglected, institutions.

Working papers are intermediary products, and they are released in the interest of timely distribution of Project results to stimulate scholarly discussion and inform policy debates. A full list of these papers is provided inside the back cover.

The production of these working papers owes much to the devoted efforts of our project staff. The present paper benefited greatly from the editorial work of Regina List, the project manager; Mimi Bilzor, communications associate; and Brittany Anuszkiewicz, project assistant. On behalf of the project’s core staff, I also want to express our deep gratitude to our project colleagues around the world, to the International Advisory Committee that is helping to guide our work, and to the many sponsors of the project listed at the end of this paper.

The views and opinions expressed in these papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views or opinions of the institutions with which they are affiliated. The Johns Hopkins University, its Institute for Policy Studies, the Center for Civil Society Studies, or any of their officers or supporters.

We are delighted to be able to make the early results of this project available in this form and welcome comments and inquiries either about this paper or the project as a whole.

Lester M. Salamon
Project Director
Volunteering in Cross-National Perspective: Evidence From 24 Countries

Introduction

The “legitimation crisis” (Habermas, 1975) that has enveloped the state and large-scale corporate enterprise in recent years has prompted a frantic search for alternatives among political leaders and community activists in many parts of the world. A useful byproduct of this search has been the discovery, or re-discovery, of an alternative social force (Touraine, 1988), the spontaneous self-organization of individuals in pursuit of collective goals, epitomized by the popular social movements defining the 20th century including the suffragists; Gandhism; the Liberation Theology, Civil Rights, anti-apartheid, anti-war, feminist, and environmental movements; “Solidarnosc”; and recently the growing protest movement against the negative aspects of globalization.

Unfortunately, however, the impulses toward self-organization and social participation have become a Rorschach blot onto which different people project their own expectations, hopes, or fears. In the process, a romantic mythology has grown up picturing an epic battle between two legendary foes: free and spontaneous citizen action versus formal organizations and social institutions. Individuals, we are often told, have a natural propensity toward voluntary mutual cooperation, but that propensity is inhibited or even destroyed by obstacles erected by formal institutions, especially the state. This mythology has led to a belief that civic participation is declining in modern societies as they become more organized and more affluent, but also more alienated. As the specter of “bowling alone” (Putnam, 2000) is haunting developed democracies, the less developed countries, not yet “spoiled” by modernization, are often seen as a mainstay of vibrant voluntarism and spontaneous social activism. If only the formal structures could be reduced, goes the argument, the natural forces of self-organization could reassert themselves and provide the needed solution to a vast array of social problems, including overcoming poverty, promoting economic development, protecting the environment, and enhancing the quality of life.

This paper takes a hard-nosed look at voluntary social participation in a cross-national perspective. Drawing on data gathered by the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (CNP), it dispels the popular myth of declining civic participation in the advanced democracies. It demonstrates that volunteering is augmented rather than inhibited by a formal organizational base, which in turn grows as a result of state support. What is more, it shows how the social roles and functions of volunteering have been affected by social forces that have shaped the nonprofit sector throughout the 20th century: social class relations during industrialization, government social policies, and organized religion. The conclusions that emerge from this analysis strongly suggest that volunteering, and more generally civic participation and self-organization of individuals to pursue common interests, are not acts of “spontaneous combustion” or “immaculate conception,” but instruments and outcomes of social policies that are highly dependent on each country’s institutional path of development.

To explore these points, the discussion here falls into two major sections. First, we describe the project from which the data presented here are drawn and outline the major findings
of this work with regard to the scope and structure of volunteering. Against this backdrop, we then assess a number of alternative explanations for the patterns that we discover, looking first at possible explanations of the scale of volunteering and then at possible explanations of its varying structure from place to place. A concluding section then pulls these strands of analysis together and assesses their implications for our broader understanding of volunteering internationally.

Volunteering in 24 Countries: Major Findings

BACKGROUND:
THE JOHNS HOPKINS COMPARATIVE NONPROFIT SECTOR PROJECT

The data on volunteering examined here represent one product of a broader inquiry into the scope, structure, financing, and role of the nonprofit sector undertaken by a collaborative team of international researchers under the auspices of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (CNP). Using common definitions and a common methodology, the CNP team has collected information on nonprofit organizations in 24 countries (Table 1).

![Table 1](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Western Europe</th>
<th>Central and Eastern Europe</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In each of the covered countries, local researchers collected data on a broad range of entities that meet five key criteria:

- They have some kind of formal organizational structure (e.g., a set of rules, formal or informal, that define goals, activities, membership, selection and competencies of officers, the use of resources, etc.);

---

1 The first phase of the project, begun in 1989, focused in-depth on eight countries (France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the U.K. and the U.S.). The second phase, begun in 1996, updated information in most of these countries and extended the analysis to 17 additional countries. Data collection is still underway in more than a dozen other countries.
They are self-governing (i.e., are not a subordinate part or agency of another organization);

They are not profit distributing (i.e., any surplus generated by their operations is plowed back into the organization, not distributed among the organization’s officers or owners);

They are private (i.e., are not a part or an agency of the government); and

They are voluntary (i.e., membership is not coerced or mandated by law, and the entities customarily receive donations of money, other property, or labor).

Such organizations were then classified according to their principal activity, as outlined in Table 2. Religion-based service organizations were generally included in the relevant fields of activity together with nonreligious providers. By contrast, religious worship organizations, such as parishes, temples, and mosques, were reported separately, where such data were available. The CNP collected data on several dimensions of these entities including paid employment, volunteers, and financing structure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2</th>
<th>Fields of Nonprofit Activity Covered by the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Education and research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Social services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Major findings of the CNP and a more detailed description of data collection methodology have been reported elsewhere (Salamon et al., 1999). For the purpose of this paper, suffice it to say that the nonprofit sector represents a major economic force: a $1.1 trillion industry that employs 19.5 million full-time equivalent (FTE) paid workers in the 24 countries on which data are so far available. Volunteer work contributed to these organizations is equivalent to another 11 million FTE jobs. What is more, the size of the nonprofit sector (measured by paid nonprofit employment as a share of total non-agricultural employment) varies considerably from under 1 percent in Mexico and Romania, to over 12 percent in the Netherlands. While the nonprofit sector is dominated by traditional services (health, education, and social services), its composition also varies considerably among countries.

Although remunerated transactions (such as paid employment or cash flows) are very useful comparative indicators of the nonprofit sector’s size and structure, they do not represent what in the public eye constitutes the essence of this type of institution: voluntary contributions

---

2 This figure does not include so-called informal volunteering, i.e., voluntary work carried on outside any organizational framework, because this type of volunteering is very difficult to define, and therefore poses serious problems of cross-national comparability.
of time and money. Of these two, volunteer work turns out to constitute the lion’s share of private philanthropy, on average outweighing private cash donations by a ratio of 2:1 (Figure 1). Therefore, volunteering adds an important dimension to the picture of the nonprofit sector drawn by economic indicators—it gives social salience\textsuperscript{3} to nonprofit operations. It stands to reason that a relatively high volume of volunteer input contributed to nonprofit entities reflects a relatively high level of importance attributed to the work of these entities by society at large.\textsuperscript{4}

\textbf{Figure 1}
\textit{Volunteering and Cash Giving as Shares of Total Nonprofit Philanthropic Income}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{Volunteering and Cash Giving as Shares of Total Nonprofit Philanthropic Income}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{3} This term denotes the visibility of social facts and the importance attributed to them by members of a society.
\textsuperscript{4} By contrast, cash donations cannot be interpreted that way. Due to a relatively low volume of cash contributions in general, a few large donations can substantially affect the overall distribution of this kind of support, thus reflecting the choices made by wealthy donors rather than by society at large.
In the next section, we present our findings on the amount and distribution of volunteer input.

**VOLUNTEERING PATTERNS IN 24 COUNTRIES**

To assess the extent of volunteering in our target countries, we relied primarily on population surveys. Some of these surveys were expressly commissioned by our local associates (e.g. in Brazil, France, Israel, and Japan). In other countries (e.g. Australia or the Netherlands), we relied on surveys conducted by government agencies. In some countries (Austria, Belgium, Colombia, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Sweden, and Mexico), however, we had to rely on various organizational surveys to estimate the total volume of volunteering. In such instances, our local associates made every effort to include all types of entities that engage volunteer input.\(^5\) We thus believe that we were able to capture most volunteer input in every target country.\(^6\)

Figure 2 below records the levels of volunteering we found in the 24 countries we studied, expressed as a proportion of total nonagricultural employment. This method eliminates differences due to the vastly different sizes of national economies, thus creating a cross-nationally comparable indicator.\(^7\)

**Variations in scale.** As this figure clearly indicates, the relative size of volunteer input varies greatly among the countries we studied. On average, it constitutes 2.5 percent of non-agricultural employment, but in Sweden and the Netherlands it exceeds that average by a ratio of 3:1. By contrast, the less developed countries of Eastern Europe and Latin America have rather low levels of volunteering relative to the size of their economies—1 percent or less.\(^8\)

Even a cursory examination of Figure 2 reveals findings that are at least puzzling, if not surprising. Contrary to the popular perception of declining civic participation in the developed democracies, the level of volunteering in most of these countries (10 out of 15) is well above the

\(^5\) For further details on the CNP methodology see Salamon et al., 1999.

\(^6\) These types of volunteering are excluded from this analysis: volunteering for government agencies, informal volunteering for relatives and family, and certain types of religious volunteering. Volunteering for government is not captured by organizational surveys, and we tried to exclude it from population surveys to the extent it was possible. Since government volunteering often involves some form of official compulsion, it may not represent volunteering in a true sense. In any case, the amount of this volunteering is minuscule and has a negligible effect on national totals. “Informal volunteering” denotes volunteer work performed mostly for family and relatives. It thus differs markedly from the public good volunteering that is our principal focus here. As far as religion-based volunteering is concerned, we included it in the respective fields of activity together with secular volunteering. For example, volunteering for a church-affiliated soup kitchen is included in the field “Social Services.” However, some countries also reported a certain amount of religion-based volunteering that was not allocated to any of the fields. This “unallocated” religion-based volunteering (relatively large in the U.S., the U.K., Argentina, and Brazil, but minuscule in other countries) is an unspecified mixture of service-related volunteering (e.g. providing services to the community) and religious worship volunteering. We ran all analyses reported in this paper with and without this “unallocated” volunteering, and we found that its inclusion makes very little difference to the obtained results. However, since not all countries reported this “unallocated” religion-based volunteering, we decided to exclude it from our final analyses to improve the cross-national comparability of the results.

\(^7\) This method slightly overestimates the relative level of volunteering in less developed countries vis-à-vis the developed ones, which tend to have much smaller agricultural employment. This “overestimation” compensates for imperfect information due to the relative paucity of statistical data sources in less developed countries.

\(^8\) Including the “unallocated” religion-based volunteering (see footnote 6) does not substantially change this picture. This is so because volunteer input in most less developed countries is so small that adding a fraction of it, no matter how large in relative terms, is insufficient to close the gap that separates them from the developed countries.
24-country average. What is more, it varies considerably not just between the developed and the less developed countries, but also among the developed countries.

**Figure 2**

*Volunteering in 24 Countries*

Variation in composition of volunteering. Volunteering varies not only in its overall volume, but also in its distribution across activity fields. Table 3 shows the shares of all FTE volunteering distributed across 10 fields of activity\(^9\) in 23 countries.\(^10\) A convenient way of showing the cross-national variation we observed is to calculate standard deviations\(^11\) for each

---

\(^9\) Religious worship has been omitted because of incomplete data. However, as already noted, volunteering for religion-based service organizations has been included in the respective service fields.

\(^10\) Austria is not included because we could not distribute the total volunteer input to the respective fields.

\(^11\) Standard deviation is a measure of dispersion that indicates the number of observations (countries) located within a specified range from the sample mean. Specifically, about one third of the observations have values that are more than one standard deviation greater than, or one standard deviation smaller than, the sample mean. For example, the mean for culture is 26.7 percent and the standard deviation is 16.1 percent, thus approximately 7-8 cases (1/3 of 23 countries included in Appendix Table 1) have values greater than 42.8 percent (26.7+16.1) or smaller than 10.6 percent (26.7-16.1). Indeed, four countries (Czech Republic, Finland, France, and Sweden) have shares exceeding the value 42.8 percent and four additional countries (Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) have shares that are below the value 10.6 percent.
field. The larger the standard deviation, the greater the diversity among countries with respect to the given type of volunteering.

The fields with the greatest average shares of volunteering are social services and culture and recreation. These two fields combined absorb nearly 60 percent of all volunteer input in the countries we studied. They also have the largest standard deviations (18.9 percent and 16.1 percent respectively), which means that the amount of volunteer input in these fields varies significantly from country to country.

Table 3
Distribution of Volunteering, by Field, 23 Countries, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Average Share of FTE Volunteers</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic/advocacy</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundations</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The remaining 40 percent of volunteer effort is distributed among 8 fields, of which the most significant are health (7.8 percent), community and economic development (7.2 percent), and education (6.8 percent), followed by unions and professional associations (5.7 percent) and civic and advocacy activity (5.3 percent). The largest cross-country variation among these eight fields was in the area of development (9.7 percent), followed by unions and professional associations (8.7 percent), health (6.2 percent), and education (6 percent).

These data indicate that while most volunteer input tends to concentrate in the areas of social services and culture and recreation, there are substantial differences among countries in the distribution of that input. In some countries (e.g. in Latin America) recreation attracts a negligible share of volunteer input, while in others (e.g. in Eastern and Western Europe) it attracts a much larger share. The same pertains to other fields of activity, especially social services (8.2 percent in Sweden versus 97 percent in Peru), education (less than 1 percent in Belgium and Israel versus 21 percent in Brazil), and health (less than 1 percent in Belgium and Peru versus 28 percent in Israel). In sum, not only does the amount of volunteer activity vary substantially cross-nationally, but so does its composition.

How can we explain these puzzling differences in the amount and composition of volunteering among nations? Are these differences produced by circumstances specific to individual countries, or by broader social forces that transcend national boundaries and operate on an international scale?
Explaining Patterns of Volunteering

To answer these questions we examined a number of models of voluntary participation we found in the literature and assessed their capabilities to help us understand the puzzle uncovered by the CNP data.

EXPLAINING THE AMOUNT OF VOLUNTEERING

To explain the variation in the amount of volunteering we found, two broadly defined categories of explanation are available in the social science literature. The first of these is based on a model that sees human behavior as a series of responses of individual human actors to opportunities and constraints created by macro-structural forces in the social environment, such as the market or the state. The second model portrays individual behavior as a product of social connections and interactions (also known as micro-structural forces).

The macro-structural approach. In this line of thinking, patterns of human behavior are viewed as the response of individuals to the same set of conditions created by the economy or government policies. For example, social movements are explained as a reaction to unacceptable economic conditions or government’s failure or inability to satisfactorily perform its function. When applied to volunteering, this argument takes two different forms. The first holds that government inability or unwillingness to produce certain kinds of collective goods creates an opportunity and an incentive for private voluntary action to produce such goods. Thus, the amount of voluntary participation is negatively correlated with government production of collective goods—the lower the government production, the more room for private voluntary action (cf. Weisbrod, 1978). By the same token, a high level of government involvement in the production of collective goods “crowds out” traditional providers of these services, such as social solidarity networks and nonprofits and discourages private philanthropy.

Another version of this approach, proposed, among others, by Fukuyama (1995), argues that people have a natural propensity to form social solidarity networks, which promote trust—a necessary condition of voluntary action. However, that natural propensity can be inhibited by excessive government restrictions or hostility toward nongovernmental institutions. That, in turn, inhibits the development of trust, and by implication, volunteering.

The macro-structural arguments lead to two hypotheses regarding cross-national variation in the amount of volunteering. First, we may expect that the greater the government’s involvement in the provision of social services, the smaller the amount of volunteering due to the “crowding out” effect. Second, the more hostile and restrictive the government’s policies toward nongovernmental activity and institutions, the smaller the amount of volunteering we can expect.

Testing the “crowding out” hypothesis is relatively easy. A good indicator of government involvement in the provision of social services is the level of government social welfare spending expressed as a share of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). To test its
effect on the amount of volunteering, we used linear regression. We standardized\(^\text{12}\) both variables to facilitate presentation of the observed relationship in a graphic form (see Figure 3).

Figure 3 shows that the “crowding out” hypothesis offers little help in explaining cross-national variation in the amount of volunteering. This hypothesis implies that the higher the level of government social welfare spending, the lower the amount of private volunteering. However, the data in Figure 3 show the opposite to be true: high levels of government social welfare spending are associated with high levels of volunteering. What is more, the relationship is quite strong: it explains 36.5 percent of the cross-national variance in the amount of volunteering.

Testing the government restrictiveness hypothesis is a bit trickier because such restrictiveness is not easy to define, and even less so to measure. One way to overcome that difficulty is to use a proxy—a measure that indirectly reflects the phenomenon in question. A useful proxy can be the level of government financial support for the nonprofit sector. Although government financing can impose various restrictions on the recipient organizations, such restrictions are usually meant to prevent abuses rather than suppress the organization’s activity

\(^{12}\)Standardization involves converting the actual values (percentages) to z-scores, which position each country vis-à-vis the 24-country means. For example, the z-score negative 1.5 means that the country is located 1.5 standard deviations below the mean on this measure. Z-scores allow a clearer graphic presentation of relationships among countries than the original measures do.
altogether. On the other hand, the absence of government funding usually indicates hostility or at best indifference toward the nonprofit sector. We can thus reasonably assume that the level of government financing of the nonprofit sector reflects government’s attitude toward private voluntary action.

Figure 4 reports the results of such an analysis. What it shows is that the relationship between government financial support for the nonprofit sector and the amount of volunteering runs essentially in the same direction as the government restrictiveness hypothesis claims. The higher the level of financial support for the nonprofit sector, and presumably the more favorable the government disposition toward private voluntary action, the greater the level of voluntary participation. However, the observed relationship fails to meet the criteria of statistical significance, and its explanatory power is rather weak—it explains only 9 percent of the cross-national variance in the amount of volunteering. So the government restrictiveness hypothesis does not offer much help in explaining cross-national variation in the amount of volunteering either.

The micro-structural approach. The key proposition of this line of argument is that individual behavior is an integral part of social interaction rather than an individualistic response to environmental stimuli. Underlying this view is the observation that collective action usually requires certain personal sacrifices from participants, while the benefits resulting from that action are typically available to all members of a group regardless of their participation. Consequently, a rational person has no reason to get involved in such action at all. Yet, people do participate in collective actions.

To explain this apparent paradox, the micro-structural approach posits that attaining the explicitly professed goal is not the only, or even the most powerful, incentive to become involved in a collective action. Other incentives are created by social ties and interaction among individuals (Snow et al., 1980; Snow et al., 1986). Such incentives may include values and expectations of what is socially appropriate, opportunities for social bonding, or gaining social prestige. Following this reasoning Sokolowski (1996) demonstrated that the amount of volunteering is affected by a person’s embeddedness in social networks that encourage volunteering, especially by contacts with voluntary organizations. A logical extension of this argument is that the amount of volunteering in a country depends on the extensiveness of social networks and solidarity ties that are conducive for collective action.

Since measuring social networks can be a methodologically challenging task (White et al., 1976), for the sake of simplicity we use a proxy—the size of the nonprofit sector. The underlying assumption is that the nonprofit sector represents the organizational resource base that, at least in part, promotes and sustains volunteer participation. The hypothesis informed by this approach holds that the greater the size of the nonprofit sector in a country, the greater the amount of volunteer participation.

---

13 Such criteria specify the probability that the observed relationship is a result of a chance (i.e., statistical error). The conventionally accepted level of that probability is less than 5 percent. The probability of error in the relationship shown in Figure 4 is 8 percent.

14 A corollary to the micro-structural approach holds that individual attitudes toward volunteer participation are typically shaped by social solidarity networks or participation in voluntary action. Therefore, the incidence of such attitudes is not considered a cause of volunteer participation.
To test this hypothesis, we measure the size of the nonprofit sector by the number of paid FTE jobs in the nonprofit sector. Although obviously not all paid staff in nonprofit organizations are directly involved in working with volunteers, this is still a good indicator of the overall organizational capacity of the nonprofit sector. That capacity, in turn, is what the micro-structural approach identifies as the factor that promotes initial recruitment of volunteers and sustains their participation for an extended time period.

We test this hypothesis in the same manner as we did before, by using a linear regression approach and a graphic presentation of the relationship.

The results, reported in Figure 5, indicate that the micro-structural hypothesis is quite helpful in explaining cross-national variation in the amount of volunteering. The relationship between the size of the nonprofit sector and the amount of volunteering turned out to be quite robust, explaining over 27 percent of cross-national variance in the amount of volunteering. Countries whose nonprofit sector has a larger than average nonprofit staff also tend to have a larger amount of volunteering (upper-right quadrant in Figure 5). In the same vein, countries with smaller than average nonprofit sectors tend to have smaller amounts of volunteering (lower-left quadrant).

Based on this finding we can conclude that contrary to popular perceptions, paid nonprofit employment encourages rather than “crowds out” private volunteer action. This is so because recruiting volunteers and sustaining their participation over time require organizational
resources, and such resources are typically proportional to the size of the nonprofit sector. Thus, the larger the nonprofit sector (measured by the size of its paid staff), the greater the amount of volunteer input.

The above conclusion requires two caveats, however. First, while our data generally support the positive relationship between the size of paid nonprofit staff and the amount of volunteering, there are two notable exceptions—Sweden and Finland. Despite their relatively small paid nonprofit staff, both countries boast quite significant amounts of volunteering (upper-left quadrant). These outliers suggest that the claimed relationship is not as straightforward as it seems and requires further investigation.

What is more, the micro-structural hypothesis provides only an interim explanation of volunteer participation. The size of the nonprofit sector is the intervening variable that explains how volunteer participation is solicited and sustained. But to get to the bottom of the matter we need to determine what causes the nonprofit sector to be large or small.

**Explaining nonprofit sector size.** To take the analysis this next step, we follow the insights of the social origins theory (Salamon and Anheier, 1998; Salamon, Sokolowski, and Anheier, 2000). This theory explains the development (and thus relative size) of the nonprofit sector as an outcome of broadly defined power relations among social classes and key social institutions. Historically, social welfare policies have been a response to the rise and
containment of working class mobilization. In the most general terms, the stronger the challenge coming from working class mobilization, the more generous government social programs. However, the stronger the power of the conservative elements of society, such as landed upper classes or organized religion, the greater the likelihood either that these pressures will be resisted or that at least some of the resulting social programs will be channeled through private nonprofit organizations.

The social origins theory identifies four different patterns of government-nonprofit sector development. As shown in Table 4, these patterns are defined by two key variables: the size of the nonprofit sector measured by its paid employment, and the level of government social welfare spending.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nonprofit sector size</th>
<th>Government social welfare spending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the so-called liberal model, low government social welfare spending is associated with a relatively large nonprofit sector. Such a model is most likely where middle class elements are clearly in the ascendance, and where opposition either from traditional landed elites or strong working class movements has either never existed or been effectively held at bay. This is the model around which much of the prevailing theory of the nonprofit sector has been framed. It features a significant ideological and political hostility to the extension of government social welfare protections and a decided preference for voluntary approaches instead. The upshot is a relatively limited level of government social welfare spending and a sizeable nonprofit sector, focusing mainly on the delivery of human services.

At the opposite extreme is the social democratic model. In this model, state-sponsored and state-delivered social welfare protections are quite extensive and the room left for service-providing nonprofit organizations quite constrained. This type of model is most likely where working class elements are able to exert effective political power, albeit typically in alliance with other social classes. While the upshot is a limited service-providing nonprofit sector, however, it is not necessarily a limited nonprofit sector overall. To the contrary, given the political battles likely to be involved in the extension of state-provided welfare protections, we can expect nonprofit organizations still to be quite active in such societies, but with a significantly different role, a role not as service providers but as vehicles for the expression of political, social, or even recreational interests.

In between these two models are two additional ones, which have tended to be overlooked in prevailing theories, but which may actually be most pervasive. Both of these are characterized by strong states. However, in one, which we have characterized as the corporatist model, the state has either been forced or induced to make common cause with nonprofit
institutions, so that nonprofit organizations function as one of several “pre-modern” mechanisms that are deliberately preserved by the state in its efforts to retain the support of key social elites while pre-empting more radical demands for social welfare protections.

The fourth possible model is what we term the statist model. In this model, the state retains the upper hand in a wide range of social policies, but not as the instrument of an organized working class, as in the social democratic regimes. Rather it exercises power on its own behalf, or on behalf of business and economic elites, but with a fair degree of autonomy sustained by long traditions of deference and a much more pliant religious order. In such settings, limited government social welfare protection does not translate into high levels of nonprofit action, as in the liberal regimes. Rather, both government social welfare protection and nonprofit activity remain highly constrained.

It needs to be emphasized that while individual models might have dominated certain countries at certain time periods, it would be a mistake to exclusively identify these models with specific countries. Most countries came under the influence of different policy regimes in different time periods, which left varying degrees of influence. For example, the U.S. largely followed the liberal model before the Great Depression, but the subsequent social welfare policies, especially the “Great Society” programs instituted under the Johnson administration, introduced a corporatist element (Dobkin-Hall, 1987; Salamon, 1995). In the same vein, central planning regimes in Eastern Europe had instituted statist policies, which were later reversed during the 1989 reforms.

The immediate benefit of the social origins theory for our discussion of volunteering is that it explains cross-national variation in the size of the nonprofit sector. It thus supplements the micro-structural explanation of volunteering discussed earlier in this paper, which links the amount of volunteering to the nonprofit sector’s size. As Table 4 shows, liberal and corporatist regimes usually produce larger nonprofit sectors than social-democratic or statist regimes. We can thus expect that the amount of volunteering in countries with strong liberal or corporatist traditions is generally larger than in those with statist and social-democratic traditions.

Yet, as we noted earlier, two social-democratic countries in our sample, Finland and Sweden, are exceptions to this pattern—they have small nonprofit sectors measured in terms of paid nonprofit staff but large amounts of volunteer input. This inconsistency suggests that the relationship between nonprofit sector paid employment and volunteer participation is not as straightforward as it initially appeared. Because organizations are goal-oriented entities, they recruit and maintain volunteers to achieve their own missions and objectives. We thus need to examine the functions and roles nonprofit entities play under different regime types to understand their effect on volunteering. We explore this theme in the next section, where we discuss cross-national variations in the structure of volunteering.

EXPLAINING THE STRUCTURE OF VOLUNTEERING

To understand the cross-national variation in the structure of volunteering, we need to link it to the key roles the nonprofit sector performs in different countries. The two roles of interest from the standpoint of the social origins theory (also identified in other writing, cf.
Kramer, 1981) are the service role and the expressive role. The service role is self-explanatory: it simply includes activities that have a use-value to society, such as fulfilling people’s needs, solving social problems, or emergency relief. By contrast, the expressive role denotes activities whose main purpose is the actualization of values or preferences, such as pursuit of artistic expression, preservation of cultural heritage or natural environment, political mobilization and advocacy, or the enhancement of the quality of life.

The performance of these two key roles by the nonprofit sector depends on social-political conditions. Certain conditions can encourage one role while discouraging the other, or perhaps provide opportunities for both roles to grow. The four regime types outlined by the social origins theory represent social forces that differentially affect the performance of these two roles.

The social-democratic regime developed as a result of successful working class mobilization that was able to compel the state to deliver a generous package of social welfare services. Consequently, the service role of the nonprofit sector did not have much opportunity to develop because it would simply duplicate many services already provided by the state. On the other hand, the expressive role could grow unimpeded, and even be encouraged by key political actors, because this role is instrumental for political mobilization that forms the power basis for the coalition of forces that support the social-democratic regime.

The liberal regime, on the other hand, is characterized by laissez-faire government policies, which in principle neither encourage nor impede private action (unless such action breaks the law, of course). Such minimalist government involvement in public affairs can encourage the development of both roles, but on the other hand it frequently constrains the nonprofit service role due to a lack of funding. The growth of the service role is therefore limited to what can be supported by the voluntaristic (instead of state-sponsored) approach to social problems. The expressive role develops in response to the need for self-organization and pursuit of community interests, political representation and advocacy, and the production of culture. However, limited funding availability may impose constraints on its growth as well.

Under the corporatist regime, the nonprofit sector serves as a tool of public service delivery, so naturally the service role is encouraged to grow, while the expressive role is likely to be discouraged. It needs to be emphasized, however, that this regime type’s response to working class mobilization is appeasement rather than outright repression. Consequently, the expressive role may experience some limited growth as an expression of residual attempts at working-class mobilization. Another possible source of limited growth of the expressive role under the corporatist regime is the salience of organized religion, which may be attracted by the possibility of using the nonprofit sector as a vehicle to “win the hearts and minds” of the population (cf. James, 1987).

Finally, under the statist regime the nonprofit sector is a potential challenger to government hegemony. Such a condition does not create a favorable environment for the expressive role of the nonprofit sector, except perhaps in a very limited way when the nonprofit sector serves as a vehicle for pro-government political mobilization. Unlike the corporatist regime, this regime type is more likely to use the power of the state to directly suppress any grass
roots mobilization. Since the service role of the nonprofit sector is typically apolitical and does not directly threaten government’s hegemony, it has a greater chance of avoiding such repression than the expressive role. Autocratic regimes may even see nonprofit social welfare organizations as a band-aid solution to social problems resulting from an inadequate public social safety net. Consequently, the service role is likely to dominate the tiny nonprofit sector under such regimes. Assuming that the structure of volunteering reflects the key roles of the nonprofit sector, we can therefore expect the following relationships between regime types and the structure of volunteering:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime type</th>
<th>Volunteering amount</th>
<th>Dominant Volunteering Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social-democratic</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Expressive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporatist</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statist</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To see how the expectations outlined in Table 5 fit the data, we grouped the types of activities identified in Table 2 into two key roles as follows. The expressive role is represented by culture, sports, recreation, environmental protection, political expression, advocacy, labor unions, and professional and business associations. The service role, by contrast, includes education, health, social services, and development and housing. Activities that do not clearly represent either role—international relations, foundations, and activities not elsewhere classified—have been grouped in a separate category labeled “other.” Figure 6 shows the data from Appendix Table 1 grouped by key roles as defined above.

As shown in Figure 6, countries fall into two broad patterns in terms of dominant type of volunteer involvement. The first pattern, represented by the eight countries listed in the upper section of Figure 6, is characterized by the dominance of the expressive role, which attracts most (50 percent or more) of the volunteer activity in each of these countries. In the second pattern, represented by fourteen countries listed in the lower section of Figure 6, volunteer activity is concentrated in the service fields. These two patterns also differ in the relative importance of civic engagement activities (such as advocacy or political mobilization), which is much higher in the expressive-dominant than in the service-dominant pattern (on average 15 percent versus 6 percent of all volunteering, respectively).

Most countries that we studied clearly follow one of these two patterns, but there are a few exceptions. In Japan, service fields are dominant over the expressive fields, but do not constitute more than half of all volunteer input. The reason is that an unusually large proportion of volunteering (30 percent of the total) could not be assigned to any of the activity fields listed in Table 2, and was thus listed as "not elsewhere classified." However, when the “not elsewhere classified” group is factored out, the service field accounts for 57 percent of the remaining

---

15 We did not include religion-based volunteering since it could not be easily allocated to either “service” or “expressive” fields.
volunteering in Japan. In Hungary, the share of the expressive role is slightly larger than that of the service role (46.5 percent versus 45.8 percent respectively), but does exceed 50 percent. In Mexico, however, the two shares are equal in size (49 percent).

Do these patterns of dominance correspond with the regime types, as stipulated by the social origins theory? To answer this question we assigned each of the 23 countries to a regime type according to the criteria outlined in Table 4 above as well as historical patterns of social and institutional development. In most cases, the size of the nonprofit sector and the amount of government social spending alone suffice to classify a country into a regime category. But as we noted earlier, some countries experienced different regime types in different time periods, and these two other criteria must weigh against the social and institutional history to make a historically accurate allocation to a regime category.

16 Austria was excluded because of the missing data on the distribution of volunteering among fields.
Both Italy and the U.K., for example, have relatively high levels of government social welfare spending like Western Europe welfare states. However, the strong, if ambiguous, position of the Church in the Italian social welfare system argues for treating this country as a “corporatist” rather than a “social democratic” case. And the long history of limited government social welfare spending prior to the post-World War II Beveridge reforms in health care argues for assigning the U.K. to the “liberal” pattern rather than the “social democratic” one. Similarly, Spain falls close to the average levels on both of our variables, making it difficult to assign it to one of the four models. Given the powerful role of religion and the limited success of working class mobilization in Spain, however, it seems to fit closely into the “corporatist” model. Finally, the unusual mixture of relatively high government social welfare spending and restricted avenues for nonprofit development in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia make it necessary to treat these countries as a hybrid of statism and social democracy.

Having classified all countries to appropriate regime categories, we made predictions about the amount of volunteering and the size of the service and expressive roles based on the criteria specified in Table 5. In the case of the “hybrid” category for Eastern European countries, we predicted low levels of volunteering and the dominance of the expressive role in volunteering. The former is the result of constraints imposed on civil society under the Communist regime, the latter has its roots in the Communist social policy.

We then tested these predictions against the data we collected. Volunteering amount was considered moderate if it fell within +/- 1 percent of the sample mean, which is 2.5 percent. All values below 1.5 percent were considered “small,” and all values above 3.5 percent were considered “large.” The role was considered “dominant” if it included the largest percentage-share of all volunteering (in all but three cases, more than 50 percent). The classification of individual countries into regime types, predicted and observed amounts of volunteering, and role are shown in Appendix Table 2, while Table 6 below shows the summary results of this test.

The results shown in Table 6 suggest that in general the predictions derived from the social origins theory hold. The theory predicted a relatively high volume of volunteering in the liberal and social-democratic categories, moderate volunteering in the corporatist category, and low volunteering in the statist and hybrid categories. The unweighted averages are consistent with these predictions: above 3.5 percent (the lower boundary of “large” volume) for the social-democratic and liberal regime types, 3.4 percent (within the +/-1 percent range from the mean) for the corporatist type, and below 1.5 percent (the upper boundary of “low” volume) for both the statist and the hybrid regime type. Similarly, the predicted dominant volunteering types are confirmed in all types.

A closer look at individual countries (Appendix Table 2) reveals that the predictions of the social origins theory in regard to the volunteering amount were confirmed in 20 out of 23 of the cases (87 percent), whereas predictions regarding the dominant type of volunteering were correct in 19 out of the 23 cases (83 percent). While these findings provide substantial support for the theory in question, we should not ignore the cases that are inconsistent with the predictions. The amount of volunteering was incorrectly predicted in three out of 23 (13 percent)
cases: France, Italy, and the Netherlands. The dominant type of volunteering was incorrectly predicted in four cases (17 percent of all cases): France, Germany, Mexico, and the Netherlands.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Number of Cases</th>
<th>Average Volunteering as Percent of Labor Force</th>
<th>Dominant Volunteering Type and Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social democratic</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>Expressive – 80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>Service – 58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporatist</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>Service – 53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statist</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>Service – 70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid (statist/soc-dem)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>Expressive – 57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Mexico, the amount of volunteering is correctly predicted by theory, but the size of the expressive role is much greater than predicted. This is a result of the large trade union component that comprises nearly 40 percent of all volunteering. The unions for the most part have been an extension of the state bureaucracy and the former ruling party (PRI) in this country; however, the question remains whether union volunteering is a form of “machine politics” in disguise. If the answer to this question is yes, it then makes sense to factor union volunteering out. That would leave the expressive component quite small, only 20 percent of the total, which is much more in line with the statist pattern, predicted by the social origins theory.

France, Germany, and the Netherlands have a more pronounced expressive form of volunteering, and larger overall amount of volunteering, than stipulated by their assignment to the corporatist category. This can be attributed to the growth of progressive political activism during the 1960s and 1970s that influenced government social policies, especially in France (Archambault, 1997), as well as growing popularity of sports and leisure activities. For example, the Netherlands, a clear-cut case of the corporatist model due to its “pillarization” policies that incorporated religiously based nonprofit agencies into the state-financed welfare system, has a large share of its volunteer input concentrating in sports, the popularity of which has been rapidly growing since the 1960s (Veldher and Burger, 1999). A similar process can be observed in Germany. Another factor that explains the German “deviation” from the corporatist model is the country’s unification in 1990, which “infused” the state-socialist legacy found in East Germany into the country’s nonprofit sector. Although France, Germany, and the Netherlands did not conform to the hypothesis derived from the social origins theory, the developments in these countries are consistent with the general framework proposed by that theory, which views the nonprofit sector and volunteering as a part of larger social and institutional forces.

To summarize, our data show that volunteer input tends to concentrate in two activity areas that represent two key roles of the nonprofit sector: service and expressive. Varying
The salience of these roles can be explained by the effects of four regime types defined by the social origins theory: social-democratic, liberal, corporatist, and statist. An analysis of empirical data shows that in most countries we studied this is indeed the case. The volunteering structure associated with the social democratic regime (high volunteer activity, small service role, large expressive role) is most salient in Sweden and Finland, which are also classified as social democratic by the social origins criteria (small nonprofit sector, large social welfare spending). The volunteering structure associated with the statist regime (low volunteer activity, large service role, small expressive role) was found in Latin America, Japan, and Romania, also defined as statist by the social origins criteria. Mexico, which otherwise has a statist regime, had an unusually large amount of union-related volunteering. Questions remain, however, whether union volunteering in this country should be counted as true volunteering.

Similarly, differences exist in the level of volunteer activity between liberal countries, which have high volumes of volunteer input (Australia, Ireland, the U.K., and the U.S.), and corporatist countries (Argentina, Belgium, Israel, and Spain) where the volume of volunteering is moderate. France, Germany, and the Netherlands, which otherwise show strong corporatist tendencies, had an exceptionally large level of volunteering in the expressive fields. These exceptions can be explained by cultural and political factors that gained prominence during the 1960s and 1970s.

Finally, volunteering in Eastern European countries reveals a pattern that is similar to that found in both Scandinavian social democracies and statist regimes of Latin America. This is not surprising, given the policies pursued by the former Communist governments, under which social services were provided directly by the state, and voluntary associations served mainly as venues for expression of occupational interests and leisure time activities. However, in contrast to the Scandinavian social democracies, the total amount of volunteering in Eastern Europe is quite low—a legacy of government restrictions on independent citizen initiatives. We can thus conclude that the social origins theory is quite useful in explaining the volunteering patterns in the 24 countries we studied.

**Conclusions**

This paper examined data on volunteering collected as part of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project. Using a common definition and compatible methodology, these data permit a comparative picture of volunteering in 24 countries. Based on this picture, it appears that considerable cross-national variation exists in the total amount of volunteering and in the distribution of that volunteering across service fields. Contrary to the concerns of some, these data reveal that citizen participation in the form of volunteering is alive and well. Volunteering represents the equivalent of 4.5 million FTE jobs in Western Europe and nearly 5 million FTE jobs in the U.S.

To explain the cross-national variation in the amount and distribution of volunteer input, we examined different theories of collective action. The most successful in explaining the variation in the amount of volunteering was the micro-structural approach positing that volunteer input is recruited and maintained by social and organizational networks. Using paid employment as a proxy, we demonstrated that the size of the nonprofit sector is a good predictor of the
amount of volunteering in a country. Thus, countries with larger nonprofit sectors, such as those in Western Europe, tend also to have larger amounts of volunteer input.

This finding contradicts a popular myth, rooted in theories positing an adversarial relationship between free citizen action and formal institutions and organizations, that government provision of social welfare and reliance on paid employment in that provision “crowds out” volunteer participation. We found the opposite to be true, as larger government social welfare spending tends to be associated with larger amounts of volunteering. A likely explanation is that government social welfare spending is positively correlated with the size of the nonprofit sector (Salamon, Sokolowski, and Anheier, 2000).

Moreover, recently popularized views (cf. Fukuyama, 1995) identifying government as a potential culprit responsible for stymieing “spontaneous sociability” find little support in our data. We found only a very weak relationship between the government stance toward the nonprofit sector (measured by the volume of monetary support) and the amount of volunteering. Clearly, the relationship between government policies, the nonprofit sector, and volunteering is more complex than mere “hostility” or “supportiveness.”

We examined this relationship in more detail while discussing the distribution of volunteer input. We found that volunteering tends to concentrate in two different activity areas. One such area is culture, recreation, advocacy, and occupational interests, which represents the expressive role of the nonprofit sector. The other area encompasses education, health, social services, and economic development and represents the service role.

All countries we studied (except Mexico) falls into one of these patterns. To explain these patterns, we followed the insights of the social origins theory of the nonprofit sector, which views the development of the nonprofit sector as a result of a power struggle among social classes leading to four distinct regime types. We posited a connection between different combinations of the two key roles (service and expressive) and the four regime types, defined by the size of the nonprofit sector, the level of government social welfare spending, and institutional history.

We found that in most cases the structure of volunteer activity and the regime types identified by the social origins theory coincide, as hypothesized. In social democratic countries (Sweden and Finland) the amount of volunteering tends to be larger than in other countries, and most of that volunteer activity concentrates in the expressive fields, especially culture and recreation, rather than in services. In other countries, volunteer activities concentrate in service fields, but there are visible differences in the amount of volunteering among the three regime types. Volunteering tends to be higher in the liberal regime, moderate in the corporatist regime, and low in the statist regime. We also identified a hybrid (statist/social-democratic) regime type in Eastern European countries, characterized by low volunteer participation and the dominant expressive type of volunteering. Finally, some developed corporatist countries (France, Germany, and the Netherlands) have a larger than expected concentration of volunteering in the expressive fields, which can be attributed to social-political changes taking place in those countries during the 1960s and 1970s.
These findings suggest that volunteering is not just an individual choice or spontaneous outburst of altruism, but is affected by larger social and institutional forces. Countries with more developed nonprofit organizational structures tend to have a higher volume of volunteer activity, because such structures are instrumental in recruiting and maintaining volunteer participation. What is more, volunteering is a purposive action that can be used to accomplish different social goals—from self-actualization, expression of values, and enhancement of the quality of life, to the production and delivery of public goods. The salience of these different goals is affected by different political cultures and development paths.

Our investigation into cross-national patterns in volunteering indicates the need to pay more attention to the nonprofit sector and its relationship to social and political institutions. It is our hope that our exploratory effort will stimulate interest in further comparative research on volunteering and its social, organizational, and political dimensions.

References

Habermas, Juergen, 1975, Legitimation Crisis, Boston: Beacon Press.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Social Svcs</th>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Development Civic / Advocacy</th>
<th>Foundations</th>
<th>International</th>
<th>Professional</th>
<th>n.e.c.</th>
<th>Total FTE volunteers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>55.9%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>99.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>74.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>1,021.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy (1991)</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>272.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>39.4%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>390.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>253.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden (1992)</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>1,120.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western European Average (Total)</td>
<td>37.4%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>4,505.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed Countries</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Developed Country Average (Total)</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>5,897.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern European Average (Total)</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>104.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>97.3%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American Average (Total)</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>568.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-ctry Average</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>11,075.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project
Note: "-" denotes no recorded cases of volunteering;
"0.0 percent" denotes values so small that they have been rounded down to zero.
### Appendix Table 2  Testing Volunteering Amount and the Size of the Service and Expressive Roles Predicted by the Social Origins Theory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Volunteering Amount % of Labor Force</th>
<th>Dominant Role</th>
<th>Prediction confirmed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Predicted</td>
<td>Observed</td>
<td>Share of Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>corporatist</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>liberal</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>corporatist</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>statist</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>statist</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech R.</td>
<td>statist/social democratic</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>social democratic</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>3.53%</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>corporatist</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>corporatist</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary¹</td>
<td>statist/social democratic</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>corporatist</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>corporatist</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>corporatist</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan²</td>
<td>statist</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>statist</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>corporatist</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>statist</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>statist</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>statist/social democratic</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>corporatist</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>social democratic</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>liberal</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>liberal</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-ctry average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of observations that support the theory: 20

— as % of all³ observations: 87%

*1=prediction confirmed; 0=prediction not confirmed.

¹ Service role share is 45.8%.

² Expressive role share is 21%.

³ N=23 because of missing data (Austria).
THE JOHNS HOPKINS COMPARATIVE NONPROFIT SECTOR PROJECT*

Project Director: Lester M. Salamon
Program Manager and Regional Coordinator for Developing Countries: Regina List
Regional Coordinator for Central and Eastern Europe: Stefan Toepler
Data Manager: Wojciech Sokolowski
Research Assistant: Kathryn Chinnock
Consulting Associate: Leslie C. Hems
Former Associate Project Director: Helmut K. Anheier (as of December 1998)

LOCAL ASSOCIATES

Argentina
Mario Roitter
CEDES

Australia
Mark Lyons
UTS
CACOM

Austria
Christoph Badelt
Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien

Belgium
Jacques Defourny
Centre D’Économie Sociale
Université de Liège

Jozef Pacolet
Higher Institute of Labour Studies
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

Brazil
Leilah Landim
Instituto de Estudos da Religião

Colombia
Rodrigo Villar
Confederação Colombiana de ONGs

Czech Republic
Martin Potuèek/Pavol Friè
Charles University
Institute of Sociological Studies

Egypt
Amani Kandil
Arab Network for NGOs

Finland
Voitto Helander
Institute of Public Administration
Abo Academy

France
Edith Archambault
Laboratoire D’Economie Sociale
Maison des sciences économiques

Germany
Eckhard Priller
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin
AG Sozialberichterstattung

Annette Zimmer
Institut für Politikwissenschaft
Westfalische Wilhelms-Universität München

Hungary
Éva Kuti/István Sebestény
Central Statistical Office
Voluntary Sector Statistics

India
S.S. Srivastava
Society for Participatory Research in Asia

Ireland
Joyce O’Connor/Freda Donoghue
National College of Ireland

Israel
Benjamin Gidron
Ben Gurion University of the Negev
Department of Social Work

Italy
Paolo Barbetta
Istituto de Ricerca Sociale

Japan
Naoto Yamauchi/Masaaki Homma
Osaka School of International Public Policy

Kenya
Karuti Kanyinga/Winnie Mitullah
University of Nairobi
Institute for Development Studies

Lebanon
Hashem El Husseini
Lebanese University

Morocco
Salama Saidi
RAWABIT

Mexico
CEMEFI
Principal Investigator: Gustavo Verduzco
El Colegio de Mexico, A.C.

The Netherlands
Paul Dekker/Ary Burger
Social and Cultural Planning Bureau

* The following information is current as of May 1, 2001. For updated information, see the CNP Web site: www.jhu.edu/~cnp.
Norway
Hakon Lorentzen
Institutt for Samfunnsforskning
Per Selle
Norwegian Research Centre in Organization and Management

Pakistan
Hafiz Pasha
Social Policy Development Centre

Peru
Felipe Portocarrero/Cynthia Sanborn
Centro de Investigación de la Universidad del Pacífico

The Philippines
Ledivina Cariño
University of the Philippines

Poland
Ewa Les
University of Warsaw
Institute of Social Policy
Jan Jakub Wygnański
KLON/JAWOR

Romania
Daniel Saulean
Civil Society Development Foundation

Russia
Oleg Kazakov
LINKS - Moscow

Slovakia
Helena Woleková
S.P.A.C.E. Foundation

South Africa
Mark Swilling/Hanlie Van Dyk
Graduate School of Public and Development Management
University of Witwatersrand

South Korea
Tae-kyu Park / Chang-soon Hwang
Yonsei University

Spain
Jose Ignacio Ruiz Olabuénaga
CINDES

Tanzania
Andrew Kiondo/Laurean Ndumbaro
University of Dar es Salaam

Thailand
Amara Pongsapich
Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute

Uganda
Bazaara Nyangabyaki
Centre for Basic Research

United Kingdom
Jeremy Kendall/Martin Knapp
London School of Economics and Political Science

United States
Lester M. Salamon/S. Wojciech Sokolowski
Johns Hopkins University
Center for Civil Society Studies

Venezuela
Rosa Amelia Gonzalez
IESA
PROJECT FUNDERS

Academy of Finland
Aga Khan Foundation
Arab Gulf Fund
Australian Bureau of Statistics
Australian Research Council
Austrian Science Foundation
Canadian Fund (Slovakia)
Charities Aid Foundation (U.K.)
Civil Society Development Foundation (Czech Republic)
Civil Society Development Foundation (Romania)
Civil Society Development Foundation (Slovakia)
Colombian Center on Philanthropy
Deutsche Bank Foundation (Germany)
FIN (Netherlands)
Fondation de France
Ford Foundation
Foundation for an Open Society (Hungary)
Fundacion Antonio Restrepo Barco (Colombia)
Fundacion BBVA (Spain)
Humboldt Foundation/Transcoop (Germany)
Industry Commission (Australia)
Institute for Human Sciences (Austria)
Inter-American Development Bank
Inter-American Foundation
Juliana Welzijn Fonds (Netherlands)
Kahanoff Foundation (Canada)
W.K. Kellogg Foundation
King Baudouin Foundation (Belgium)
Körber Foundation (Germany)
Ministry of Church and Education (Norway)
Ministry of Culture and Sports (Norway)
Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (Netherlands)
Ministry of Environment (Norway)
Ministry of Family and Children (Norway)
Ministry of Family/World Bank (Venezuela)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Norway)
Ministry of Health, Sports and Welfare (Netherlands)
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (Finland)
C.S. Mott Foundation
National Department of Planning (Colombia)
National Research Fund (Hungary)
OPEC
Open Society Foundation (Slovakia)
Research Council of Norway
Rockefeller Brothers Fund
Joseph Rowntree Foundation (U.K.)
Sasakawa Peace Foundation (Japan)
U.S. Information Service
Yad Hadaniv Foundation (Israel)

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Nicole Alix
France
UNIOPSS

Farida Allaghi
Saudi Arabia
AGFUND

Manuel Arango
Mexico
CEMEFI

Mauricio Cabrera Galvis
Colombia

John Clark
USA
The World Bank

Pavol Demes
Slovakia
The German Marshall Fund

Barry Gaberman
USA
Ford Foundation

Cornelia Higginson
USA
American Express Company

Stanley Katz
USA
Princeton University

Kumi Naidoo
USA
Civicus

Miklos Marshell
Germany
Transparency International

John Richardson
Belgium
European Foundation Centre

S. Bruce Schearer
USA
The Synergos Institute
Volunteering in Cross-National Perspective: Evidence From 24 Countries

Defining the Nonprofit Sector: The Philippines

Social Origins of Civil Society: An Overview

The Nonprofit Sector: For What and for Whom?

Defining the Nonprofit Sector: Poland

History of the Nonprofit Sector in the Netherlands

Defining the Nonprofit Sector: Finland

Defining the Nonprofit Sector: Argentina

Defining the Nonprofit Sector: Romania

Philanthropy, Nationalism, and the Growth of Civil Society in Romania

Defining the Nonprofit Sector: Australia

Defining the Nonprofit Sector: Colombia

Defining the Nonprofit Sector: Ireland

Defining the Nonprofit Sector: The Czech Republic

Defining the Nonprofit Sector: Israel

Nonprofit Institutions and the 1993 System of National Accounts

The Third World’s Third Sector in Comparative Perspective

Defining the Nonprofit Sector: The Netherlands

Social Origins of Civil Society: Explaining the Nonprofit Sector Cross-Nationally

The Nonprofit Sector: A New Global Force

Nonprofit Law: Ten Issues in Search of Resolution

The International Classification of Nonprofit Organizations - ICNPO. Revision 1.0

Caring Sector or Caring Society? Discovering the Nonprofit Sector Cross-Nationally

Defining the Nonprofit Sector: Sweden

Defining the Nonprofit Sector: Hungary


Toward an Understanding of the International Nonprofit Sector: The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project

The Emerging Sector: A Statistical Supplement (1990 data)

To order copies of the CNP working papers, visit our Web site or call 410-516-4617 to request a publications catalog.

O N T H E C E N T E R F O R C I V I L S O C I E T Y S T U D I E S W E B S I T E  w w w.jhu.edu/~ccss

▲ Research findings from the Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project
  - Full text of The Emerging Sector Revisited: A Summary (in English and Spanish)
  - Comparative data tables
  - Country-at-a-glance tables

▲ Research findings from the Nonprofit Employment Data Project
  - Full text of state reports

▲ Abstracts of books and working papers

▲ The full text of CNP and CCSS working papers published after January 1999

▲ Links to online book ordering

▲ Program and project information

▲ Staff biographies/contact information

▲ Interview with Center Director Lester M. Salamon

▲ And much more